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Abstract
Very recently, Hartline and Lucier [HL10] studied single-parameter mechanism design prob-
lems in the Bayesian setting. They proposed a black-box reduction that converted Bayesian
approximation algorithms into Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanisms and preserved
the expected social welfare. It remains a open question if one can find similar reduction in the
more important multi-parameter setting. In this paper, we give positive answer to this question
when the prior distribution has finite and small support. We propose a black-box reduction for
designing BIC multi-parameter mechanisms. The reduction converts any algorithm into an -
BIC mechanism with only marginal loss in social welfare. As a result, for combinatorial auctions
with sub-additive agents we get an -BIC mechanism that achieves constant approximation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing computationally efficient and truthful mecha-
nism for multi-parameter mechanism design problems in the Bayesian setting.
Suppose a major Internet search service provider wants to sell multiple advertisement slots
to a number of companies. From the history of previous transactions, we can estimate a prior
distribution of each company’s valuation of the advertisement slots. What mechanism shall the
search service provider use to obtain good social welfare, or good revenue?
This is a typical multi-parameter mechanism design problem. In general, we consider the
scenario in which a principal wants to sell a number of different services to multiple heterogeneous
strategic agents subject to some feasibility constraints (e.g. total cost of providing these services
must not exceed the budget), so that some desired objective (e.g. social welfare, revenue, residual
surplus) is achieved. If we interpret this as simply a combinatorial optimization problem, then
there exists approximation algorithms for many of these problems. And the approximation ratios
of many of these algorithms are tight subject to certain computational complexity assumptions.
However, if we wants to design protocols of allocations and setting prices in order to achieve the
desired objective in the equilibrium strategic behavior of the agents, we usually have much worse
approximation ratio. Therefore, it is natural to ask the following question:
Can we convert any algorithm into a truthful mechanism while preserving the perfor-
mance, say, social welfare?
Unfortunately, from previous work we learn that this is impossible for some problems. Pa-
padimitriou et al. [PSS08] showed the first significant gap between the performance of deterministic
algorithms and deterministic truthful mechanisms via the Combinatorial Public Project problem.
Bayesian setting. The standard game theoretic model for incomplete information is the Bayesian
setting, in which the agent valuations are drawn from a publicly known distribution. The standard
solution concept in this setting is Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium. In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, each
player maximizes its expected payoff by following the strategy profile given the prior distribution
of the agent valuations.
In this paper, we will consider multi-parameter welfare-preserving algorithm/mechanism reduc-
tions in the Bayesian setting, and weaken truthfulness constraint from Incentive Compatibility (IC)
to Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC), which means truth telling is the equilibrium strategy
over random choice of the mechanism as well as the random realization of the other agent valuations.
In many real world applications such as online auctions, AdWords auctions, spectrum auctions etc.,
the availability of data of past transactions make it possible to obtain good estimation of the prior
distribution of the agent valuations. Thus, revisiting the algorithm/mechanism reduction problem
in the Bayesian setting is of both theoretical and practical importance.
Hartline and Lucier [HL10] studied this problem in the single-parameter setting. They showed
a brilliant black-box reduction from any approximation algorithm to BIC mechanism that preserves
the performance with respect to social welfare maximization. In this paper, we prove that similar
reduction also exists for the realm of multi-parameter mechanism design for social welfare! More-
over, we can also obtain BIC mechanism for revenue or residual surplus via some variants of our
black-box reduction.
Our results and technique. Our main result is a black-box reduction that converts algorithms
into BIC mechanisms with essentially the same social welfare for arbitrary multi-parameter mech-
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anism design problem in the Bayesian setting. More concretely, given an algorithm A that pro-
vides SWA social welfare, the reduction provides a mechanism that gives SWA −  social welfare
and is -BIC. The running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/. This resolves an open
problem in [HL10]. The key idea is to decouple the reported valuations and the input valua-
tions for the algorithm A. When the reported valuations are v1, v2, . . . , vn, we will manipulate
the valuations via some carefully designed intermediate algorithms B1, . . . ,Bn, and use allocation
A(B1(v1), . . . ,Bn(vn)). We prove that there exist intermediate algorithms B1, . . . ,Bn so that there
are prices that achieve BIC. Under certain conditions, the marginal loss factor in social welfare can
be made multiplicative.
As an application of this reduction, we get a (12 − )-approximate and vmax-BIC mechanism
for social welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with sub-additive agents. For the more
restricted case of fractionally sub-additive agents, we obtain (1− 1e − )-approximate mechanism.
Related work. The problem of maximizing social welfare against strategic agents is one of the
oldest and most famous problems in the area of mechanism design. It has been extensively studied
by the economists in both Bayesian and prior-free setting without considering computational power
constraint. The celebrated VCG mechanism [Cla71, Gro73, Vic61] which guarantees optimal social
welfare and incentive compatibility is one of the most exciting results in this domain. However,
implementing the VCG mechanism is NP-hard in general. This is one of the reasons that VCG
mechanism is rarely used in practice despite of its lovely theoretical features.
In the past decade, computer scientists introduced many novel techniques in the prior-free
setting to design computationally efficient mechanisms that provide incentive compatibility and/or
good approximation to optimal social welfare for various families of valuation functions.
On the one hand, Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [DNS06] proposed poly-time mechanisms
which achieved Ω(1/
√
n)-approximation for general agents and Ω(1/ log2 n)-approximation for sub-
modular agnets. Dobzinski [Dob07] later proposed a truthful mechanism which achieved an im-
proved Ω˜(1/ log n)-approximation for a strictly broader class of sub-additive agents.
On the other hand, if we focus on the algorithmic problem of maximizing social welfare assum-
ing all valuations are truthfully revealed, then the algorithm by Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira
[DNS05] gave Ω(1/
√
n)-approximation for general case and Ω(1/ log n)-approximation for sub-
additive agents. The latter approximation ratio is later improved to 12 for sub-additive agents
[Fei06] and (1− 1e ) for the more restricted class of fractionally sub-additive agents [Dob07, FV06].
The above results suggest that there exists a gap between the performance of the best poly-
time algorithms and that of the best poly-time and incentive compatible mechanism. As an effort
to study the relation between designing algorithms and designing truthful mechanisms with good
approximation ratio, Lavi and Swamy [LS05] proposed a meta-mechanism that converted strong
rounding algorithms for the standard LP of social welfare maximization into IC mechanisms. How-
ever, their approach required the rounding algorithm to work for arbitrary valuation functions.
This requirement prevents their technique to get good approximation beyond cases of general val-
uations and additive valuations (via a different linear program). But the more interesting classes
of valuations (e.g. sub-additive valuations and sub-modular valuations) lies between these two ex-
tremes. Another notable attempt on reducing IC mechanism design to algorithm design is the very
recent work by Dughmi and Roughgarden [DR10]. They proved that for any packing problem that
admitted an FPTAS, there was an IC mechanism that was also an FPTAS.
Most of the previous effort from computer scientists has focused on the prior-free setting. Until
very recently, there has been a few work that brought more and more Bayesian analysis into the
field of algorithmic mechanism design. Hartline and Lucier [HL10] gave a black-box reduction that
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converted any Bayesian approximation algorithm into a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism
that preserved social welfare in the single parameter domain. Bhattacharya et al. [BGGM10]
studied the revenue maximization problem for auctioning heterogeneous items when the valuations
of the agents were additive. Their result gave constant approximation in the Bayesian setting
even when the agents had public known budget constraints. Chawla et al. [CHMS10] considered
the revenue maximization problem in the multi-dimensional multi-unit auctions. They introduced
mechanism that gave constant approximation in various settings via sequential posted pricing.
Finally, in concurrent and independent work, Hartline et al. [HKM11] study the relation of
algorithm and mechanism in Bayesian setting and propose similar reduction. In the discrete support
setting that is considered in this paper, they use essentially the same reduction. However, their
work achieves perfectly BIC instead of -BIC. They also extend the reduction to the more general
continuous support setting.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations.
We use {xi}1≤i≤n to denote an array of size n. We also use the natural extension of this notation
for multi-dimensional arrays. We will use bold font x to denote a vector (x1, . . . , xn). We let ∆(S)
denote the set of distributions over the elements in a set S. For a random variable x, we let E [x]
denote its expectation and let σ [x] denote its standard deviation. We use subscripts to represent
the random choices over which we consider the expectation and variance. For instance, Ey∼F [x] is
the expectation of x when y is drawn from distribution F . We sometimes use Ey [x] for short when
the distribution F is clear from the context.
2.2 Model and definitions.
In this section, we will formally introduce the model in this paper. We study the general multi-
parameter mechanism design problems. In a multi-parameter mechanism design problem, a prin-
cipal wants to sell a set of services to multiple heterogeneous agents in order to optimize the
desired objective (e.g. social welfare, revenue, residual surplus, etc.). A Bayesian multi-parameter
mechanism design problem with n agents is defined by a tuple 〈I,J ,V ,F 〉.
• I = (I1, . . . , In): The set of services that the principal wants to sell to the agents.
Since we can impose arbitrary feasibility constraints on the allocations, we assume without
loss of generality that the services are partitioned into n disjoint sets I1, . . . , In so that the
services in Ii only aim for agent i, and each agent i is interested in any one of these services.
• J ⊆ I1 × · · · × In: The set of feasible allocations.
• V = V1 × · · · × Vn: The space of agent valuations.
We let Vi ⊆ RIi denote the set of possible valuations of agent i. We let vmax denote the
maximal valuation, that is, vmax = maxi,v∈Vi,S∈Ii v(S)
• F = F1 × F2 × · · · × Fn: The joint prior distribution of the agent valuations.
We assume the prior distribution is a product distribution. We let Fi ∈ ∆(Vi) denote the
prior distribution of the valuation of agent i. In this paper, we only consider distributions
with finite and polynomially large support. We will assume without loss of generality that
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the support of each distribution Fi is {v1i , . . . , v`i}. Suppose vi ∼ Fi, We will let fi(t) denote
the probability that vi = v
t
i .
For example, in the combinatorial auction problem with n agents and m items, we let [m] =
{1, 2, . . . ,m} denote the set of items. The set of services for each agent i is the set of all subsets of
items, that is, Ii = 2
[m], 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The set of feasible allocations is
J = {(S1, . . . , Sn) : Si ∈ Ii, Si ∩ Sj = ∅} .
The set of valuations, Vi, is the set of mappings from subset of items Ii to R+ that are monotone
(vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for S ⊆ T ) and normalized (vi(∅) = 0). We usually assume that the valuations in⋃
i Vi satisfies certain properties, e.g. sub-additivity, sub-modularity, etc.
Algorithm. An algorithm for a multi-parameter mechanism design problem 〈I,J ,V ,F 〉 is a
protocol (may or may not be randomized) that takes a realization of agent valuations v ∈ V as
input, and outputs a feasible allocation S ∈ J .
Mechanism. A mechanism is an interactive protocol (may or may not be randomized) between
the principal and the agents so that the principal can retrieve information from the agents (pre-
sumably via their bids), and determine an allocation of services S ∈ J and a collection of prices
p = (p1, . . . , pn). The extra challenge for mechanism design, compared to algorithm design, is to
retrieve genuine valuations from the agents and handle their strategic behavior.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we will assume the prior distribution Fi is public known. But the actual
realization vi ∼ Fi is private information of agent i. Each agent i aims to maximizes the quasi-linear
utility vi(Si) − pi, where Si is the service it gets and pi is the price. Thus, the agents may not
reveal their genuine valuations if manipulating their bids strategically can increase their utility.
Objectives. We will consider three different objectives: social welfare, revenue, and residual
surplus. The expected social welfare of a mechanism M is
SWM = Ev∼F ,(S,p)∼M(v)
[
n∑
i=1
vi(Si)
]
.
Similarly, we will let SWA denote the expected social welfare of an algorithm A.
Definition 1. An algorithm A is α-approximate in social welfare for a multi-parameter mechanism
design problem 〈I,J ,V ,F 〉, if SWA ≥ αOPT.
The expected revenue of a mechanism is
RM = Ev∼F ,(S,p)∼M(v)
[
n∑
i=1
pi
]
.
The last objective, residual surplus, was recently proposed by Hartline and Roughgarden [HR08]
as an alternative objective in the flavour of social welfare. In the residual surplus maximization
problem, the principal aims to maximize the sum of the agents’ utilities instead of the sum of their
valuations. The expected residual surplus is
RSM = Ev∼F ,(S,p)∼M(v)
[
n∑
i=1
(vi(S)− pi)
]
.
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We will let OPT denote the optimal social welfare, that is, OPT = maxM SWM. Since both rev-
enue and residual surplus are upper-bounded by social welfare. We will use OPT as our benchmark
for all three objectives.
Solution concepts. Ideally, a mechanism shall provide incentive for the agents to reveal their
valuations truthfully. In this section, we will formalize this requirement by introducing the game-
theoretical solution concepts that we use in this paper.
Definition 2. A mechanism M is Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) if for each agent i and
any two valuations vi, v˜i ∈ Vi, we have
Ev−i,(S,p)∼M(vi,v−i) [vi(Si)− pi] ≥ Ev−i,(S,p)∼M(v˜i,v−i) [vi(Si)− pi] .
Definition 3. A mechanism M is -Bayesian Incentive Compatible (-BIC) if for any agent i and
any two valuations vi, v˜i ∈ Vi,
Ev−i,(S,p)∼M(vi,v−i) [vi(Si)− pi] ≥ Ev−i,(S,p)∼M(v˜i,v−i) [vi(Si)− pi]−  .
Other than the above constraints of incentive compatibility, the mechanism shall also guarantee
that the agents always get non-negative utility. Otherwise, the agents may choose not to participate
in the mechanism. This is known as the individual rationality constraint.
Definition 4. A mechanism M is individually rational (IR) if for any realization v of agent
valuations, and any allocation S and prices p by the mechanism, we always have that vi(Si)−pi ≥ 0
for all agent i,
3 Characterization of BIC mechanisms
In this section, we will introduce a non-trivial characterization of BIC multi-parameter mechanisms
via a novel connection between BIC mechanisms and envy-free prices. This characterization inspires
our reduction in the next section.
3.1 Fractional assignment problem.
We will first introduce the fractional assignment problems, which will play a critical role in the
results of this paper, and a useful lemma about envy-free prices in fractional assignment problems.
In order to distinguish the notations for fractional assignment problems and those for the
mechanism design problems, we will use superscripts instead of subscripts to specify different entries
of a vector for the fractional assignment problems. For instance, we will use xs to denote the sth
entry of a vector x.
Let us consider a market with ` buyers and m infinitely divisible products. Each buyer s has a
non-negative demand αs, which denotes the maximal amount of products the buyer will buy. Each
product t has a non-negative supply βt, which denotes the available amount of this product in the
market. For each buyer s and each product t, we let wst denote the non-negative value of buyer s
of product t.
The goal is to set prices for the products and to assign the products to the buyers subject to
the demand and supply constraints. Thus, a solution (x,p) to the fractional assignment problem
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consists of a collection of prices p = (p1, . . . , p`) and a feasible allocation x = {xst}1≤s≤`,1≤t≤m in
the polytope: {
x : ∀s,
m∑
t=1
xst ≤ αs; ∀t,
∑`
s=1
xst ≤ βt; x ≥ 0
}
,
where xst denotes the amount of product t that is assigned to buyer s.
Definition 5. A solution (x,p) is envy-free if for any xst > 0, then t is a product that maximizes
the quasi-linear utility of agent s, and the utility for agent s is non-negative. That is,
∀s, t : xst > 0⇒ wst − pt = max
k
{wsk − pk} ≥ 0 . (1)
Definition 6. An allocation x is market-clearing if all demand constraints and supply constraints
hold with equality That is,
∀1 ≤ s ≤ ` :
m∑
t=1
xst = αs , ∀1 ≤ t ≤ m :
∑`
s=1
xst = βt .
The social welfare maximization problem for a fractional assignment problem is characterized
by the following linear program (P) and its dual (D).
(P) Maximize Σ`s=1Σ
m
t=1x
stwst s.t. (D) Minimize Σ`s=1α
sus + Σmt=1β
tpt s.t.
Σmt=1x
st ≤ αs ∀s us + pt ≥ wst ∀s, t
Σ`s=1x
st ≤ βt ∀t us ≥ 0 ∀s
xst ≥ 0 ∀s, t pt ≥ 0 ∀t
We will introduce two useful lemmas about the connection between envy-free prices and social
welfare maximization for fractional assignment problems. These lemmas were known in different
forms in the economics literature [GS99].
Lemma 1. If there exist envy-free prices p for a market-clearing allocation x, then x maximizes
the social welfare, that is, x ·w = maxz z ·w.
Proof. Suppose there exist envy-free prices p for an allocation x. Let us = maxt
{
wst − pt}. We
have that us + pt ≥ wst for all s, t. So (u,p) is a feasible solution for the dual LP.
Moreover, by definition of envy-freeness, we have
∀s, t : xst > 0⇒ us = wst − pt .
Therefore, we get that
∑`
s=1
m∑
t=1
xstwst =
∑`
s=1
m∑
t=1
xst(us + pt) =
∑`
s=1
αsus +
∑
t
βtpt .
The last equality holds because x is market clearing. Notice that x is a feasible solution to the
primal LP. By duality theorem, we get that the allocation x maximizes the social welfare for the
fractional assignment problem.
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Lemma 2. If an allocation x maximizes the social welfare, then there exist envy-free prices p for
the fractional assignment problem.
Proof. Suppose the allocation x maximizes the social welfare. Let (u,p) be an optimal solution
to the dual LP. By complementary slackness we get that xst > 0 only if the corresponding dual
constraint is tight, that is, us + pt = wst. Therefore, xst > 0 implies that wst − pt = us ≥ wsk − pk
for all k. Thus p is a collection of envy-free prices for the allocation x in this fractional assignment
problem.
Note that the above proof also gives a poly-time algorithm for finding the welfare maximizing
allocation x and the corresponding envy-free prices p by solving the primal and dual LPs. Moreover,
we also get that the envy-free prices p satisfy a weak uniqueness in the sense that it must be part
of an optimal solution for the dual LP.
Corollary 1. There exists a poly-time algorithm that computes the welfare-maximizing market-
clearing allocation and the envy-free prices.
3.2 Characterizing BIC via envy-free prices.
We first introduce some notations that will simplify our discussion. Given a mechanism M for
a multi-parameter mechanism design problem 〈I,J ,V ,F 〉, we will consider the expected values
and expected prices for each agent when it choose a specific strategy (each strategy corresponds to
reporting a specific valuation).
Assuming the other agents report their valuations truthfully, agent i’s expected value of the
service it gets, when the genuine valuation is vsi and the reported valuation is v
t
i , is
wsti = Ev−i,(S,p)∼M(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)] .
Similarly, we let pit denote the expected price the mechanism would charge to agent i if its
reported valuation is vti , that is,
pti = Ev−i,(S,p)∼M(vti ,v−i) [pi] .
By the definition of BIC and IR, the mechanismM is BIC and IR if and only if for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ s ≤ `,
wssi − psi = max
t
{wsti − pti} ≥ 0 . (2)
The above equation (2) is similar to equation (1) in the definition of envy-freeness in fractional
assignment problem. In fact, the key observation is that the above BIC condition is equivalent to
the envy-free condition for a set of properly chosen fractional assignment problems.
Induced assignment problems. For each agent i, we will consider the following induced as-
signment problem. We consider ` virtual buyers with demands fi(1), . . . , fi(`) respectively, and `
virtual products with supplies fi(1), . . . , fi(`) respectively. For each virtual buyer s and each virtual
product t, let virtual buyer s has value wsti on virtual product t. We will refer to this fractional
assignment problem the induced assignment problem of agent i.
Let us consider the identity allocation xi defined as follows:
xsti =
{
fi(s) , if s = t ,
0 , otherwise.
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We can easily verify that a collection of prices pi = (p
1
i , . . . , p
`
i) satisfies constraint (2) if and
only if pi satisfies the envy-free condition (1) of the induced assignment problem of agent i with
respect to the above identity allocation. Hence, we have the following connection between BIC
mechanism and the envy-free prices of the induced assignment problems.
Lemma 3 (Characterization Lemma [Roc87]). A mechanismM is BIC if and only if in the induced
assignment problem of each agent i the identity allocation xi = {xsti }1≤s,t≤` maximizes the social
welfare, and pi = (p
1
i , . . . , p
`
i) are chosen to be the corresponding envy-free prices.
Comparing with Myerson’s characterization. Suppose the problem falls into the single-
parameter domain. Each valuation vsi is represented by a single non-negative real number. With
a little abuse of notation, we let vsi denote this value. Without loss of generality, we assume that
v1i > · · · > v`i . We let yti denote the probability that agent i would be served if the reported
value was vti . The values wi in the fractional assignment problems of agent i are w
st
i = v
s
i y
t
i for
1 ≤ s, t ≤ `. Myerson’s famous characterization [Mye81] of truthfulness in single-parameter domain
implied that the mechanism is BIC if and only if y1i ≥ · · · ≥ y`i . Indeed, due to rearrangement
inequality, the identity allocation xi maximizes the social welfare if and only if y
1
i ≥ · · · ≥ y`i . Thus,
the characterization lemma implies Myerson’s characterization in the single-parameter domain.
4 Reduction for social welfare
Lemma 3 suggests an interesting connection between BIC and envy-free prices for the induced
assignment problems. Hence, given an algorithm A, we will manipulate the allocation by A based
on this connection in order to make it satisfy the condition in Lemma 3.
4.1 Main ideas.
Let us first briefly convey two key ideas in the construction of the welfare-preserving reduction.
The first idea is to decouple the reported agent valuations and the input agent valuations for
algorithm A. More concretely, we will introduce n intermediate algorithm B1, . . . ,Bn. Each Bi will
take the reported valuation v′i as input, then output a valuation v˜i that may or may not equals
v′i. Then, we will use algorithm A to compute the allocation S for agent valuations v˜1, . . . , v˜n, and
allocate services according to S.
If we revisit the values w˜i in the induced assignment problem of agent i after this manipulation,
we will get that for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `,
w˜sti = Ev−i,v˜∼B(vti ,v−i),S∼A(v˜) [v
s
i (Si)] .
By Lemma 3, we need to choose Bi’s carefully, so that the identity allocations in the manipulated
assignment problems are welfare-maximizing allocations. However, from the above equation we can
see that by using Bi to manipulate the ith valuation, we may change not only the structure of the
induced assignment problem of agent i, but the structure of the induced assignment problems of
other agents as well. Hence, we need to handle such correlation among the induced assignment
problems when we choose intermediate algorithms B1, . . . ,Bn.
The idea that handles this correlation is to impose an extra constraint on each intermediate
algorithm Bi: if the input valuation v′i is drawn from the distribution Fi, then the output valuation
v˜i also follows the same distribution, that is, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ t ≤ `,
Prv′i∼Fi,v˜i∼Bi(v′i)
[
v˜i = v
t
i
]
= fi(t) . (3)
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· · ·
v˜1
v˜2
v˜m
A S
B1
B2
Bm
v′1
v′m
Figure 1: High-level picture of the reduction for social welfare. Bi’s are intermediate algorithms for
manipulating the input of algorithm A. v˜i’s are the reported valuations. v′i’s are the manipulated
input valuations for algorithm A. S is the final allocation.
With this extra constraint, the values w˜i after the manipulation in the induced assignment
problem of agent i becomes
w˜sti = Ev−i∼F−i,v˜∼B(vti ,v−i),S∼A(v˜) [v
s
i (Si)]
= Ev˜−i∼F−i,v˜i∼Bi(vti),S∼A(v˜) [v
s
i (Si)]
= Ev−i∼F−i,v˜i∼Bi(vti),S∼A(v˜i,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)] .
Thus, from the Bayesian viewpoint of agent i, the intermediate algorithms B−i of other agents
are transparent. This property enables us to manipulate the structure of each assignment problem
separately.
4.2 Black-box reduction.
Given an algorithm A, the black-box reduction for social welfare will convert algorithm A into the
following mechanism MA:
1. For each agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (Pre-computation)
(a) Estimate the values wi = {wsti }1≤s,t≤` of the induced assignment problem of i with
respect to algorithm A. Let wˆi = {wˆsti }1≤s,t≤` denote the estimated values.
(b) Find the social welfare maximizing allocation xi = {xsti }1≤s,t≤` and the corresponding
envy-free prices pi = (p
1
i , . . . , p
`
i) for the induced assignment problem of agent i with
estimated values.
2. Manipulate the valuations with intermediate algorithms Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as follows: (Decou-
pling)
Suppose the reported valuation of agent i is v′i = v
s
i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let v˜i = Bi(v′i) = vti
with probability xsti /fi(s) for 1 ≤ t ≤ `.
3. Allocate services according to A(v˜). (Allocation)
(a) Let S = (S1, . . . , Sn) denote the allocation by algorithm A with input v˜.
(b) For each agent i, suppose the reported valuation is v′i = v
s
i and the manipulated valuation
is v˜i = v
t
i , charge agent i with price p
t
iv
s
i (Si)/wˆ
st
i .
The following theorem states that this reduction produces BIC while preserving the performance
with respect to social welfare.
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Theorem 1. Suppose A is an algorithm for a multi-parameter mechanism design problem 〈I,J ,V ,F 〉.
1. If the estimated values wˆi are accurate, then mechanism MA is BIC, IR, and guarantees at
least SWA of social welfare.
2. If the estimated values wˆi satisfy that for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `, wˆsti ∈ [(1− )wsti , (1 + )wsti ], then
mechanism MA is 4vmax-BIC, IR, and guarantees at least (1− 2) · SWA of social welfare.
3. If the estimated values wˆi satisfy that for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `, wˆsti ∈ [wsti − , wsti + ], then
mechanism MA is 4-BIC, IR, and guarantees at least SWA − 2n of social welfare.
Let us illustrate the proof of part 1. The proofs of the other two parts are tedious and simple
calculations along the same line. We will omit these proofs in this extended abstract.
Proof. We consider the case when the estimated values wˆi are accurate, that is, wˆ
st
i = w
st
i for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `.
Individual rationality. By our choice of envy-free prices, we have that pti ≤ wsti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `. Thus, we always guarantee
pti
vsi (Si)
wsti
≤ vsi (Si) .
So the mechanism MA that we get from the reduction always provides non-negative utilities
for the agents. Essentially the same proof also shows IR for part 2 and 3.
Bayesian incentive compatibility. We will first show that the intermediate algorithms in the
decoupling step of the reduction satisfy constraint (3). Let xi denote the social welfare maximizing
allocation that the reduction finds for the induced assignment problem of agent i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that these social welfare maximizing allocations are market-clearing. We have that if the
reported valuation v′i follows the distribution Fi, then the distribution of the manipulated valuation
v˜i satisfies that
Pr
[
v˜i = v
t
i
]
=
∑`
s=1
Pr
[
v′i = v
s
i
]
Pr
[
v˜i = v
t
i : v
′
i = v
s
i
]
=
∑`
s=1
fi(s)
xsti
fi(s)
=
∑`
s=1
xsti = fi(t) .
Indeed, the intermediate algorithms satisfy constraint (3). Thus, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n the
intermediate algorithm Bi only changes the structure of induced assignment problem of agent i and
leaves the induced assignment problems of other agents untouched.
Next, we will verify that in each of the manipulated assignment problem, the identity allocation
maximizes the social welfare and the prices are the corresponding envy-free prices.
For each agent i, we let w˜i = {w˜sti }1≤s,t≤` and p˜i = (p˜1i , . . . , p˜`i) denote the values and the
expected prices of the virtual products respectively in the manipulated assignment problem of
agent i. We have that for any 1 ≤ r, s ≤ `,
w˜rsi =
∑`
t=1
Pr
[
v˜i = v
t
i
]
Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
r
i (Si)] =
∑`
t=1
xsti
fi(s)
wrti ,
p˜si =
∑`
t=1
Pr
[
v˜i = v
t
i
]
Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i)
[
pti
vsi (Si)
wrsi
]
=
∑`
t=1
xsti
fi(s)
pti .
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Thus, in the manipulated assignment problem of agent i, the utility of the virtual buyer r of
the virtual product s, 1 ≤ r, s ≤ `, is
w˜rsi − p˜si =
∑`
t=1
xsti
fi(s)
(wrti − pti) ≤
∑`
t=1
xsti
fi(s)
max
k
{wrki − pki } = max
k
{wrki − pki } .
Since pi are chosen to be the envy-free prices, we have that x
rt
i > 0 only if w
rt
i −pti = maxk{wrki −
pki }. Hence, when agent i reports its valuation truthfully, that is, r = s, the above inequality holds
with equality. So the p˜i are envy-free prices with respect to the identity allocation x˜i of the
manipulated assignment problem of agent i. By Lemma 1 we know the allocation x˜i maximizes
the social welfare. Thus, mechanism MA is BIC according to Lemma 3.
Social welfare. The expected social welfare for this mechanism is
∑n
i=1
∑`
s=1
∑`
t=1 x
st
i w
st
i . Since
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n the allocation xi maximizes the social welfare for the induced assignment problem
of agent i, the social welfare of xi is at least as large as that of the identity allocation, that is,
∀i :
∑`
s=1
∑`
t=1
xsti w
st
i ≥
∑`
s=1
fi(s)w
ss
i = Ev∼F ,S∼A(v) [vi(Si)] .
Thus, we have that
SWMA =
n∑
i=1
∑`
s,t=1
xsti w
st
i ≥
n∑
i=1
Ev∼F ,S∼A(v) [vi(Si)] = Ev∼F ,S∼A(v)
[
n∑
i=1
vi(Si)
]
= SWA .
4.3 Estimating values by sampling.
There is still one technical issue that we need to settle in the reduction. In this section, we will
briefly discuss how to use the standard sampling technique to obtain good estimated values of
wi = {wsti }1≤s,t≤` for the induced assignment problem of agent i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
By definition, wsti is the expectation of a random variable v
s
i (Si), where Si is the allocated
service given by A over random realization of the valuations v−i of other agents and random coin
flips of the algorithm. Hence, if the standard deviation of vsi (Si) is not too large compared to
its mean (no more than a polynomial factor), then we can draw polynomially many independent
samples and take the average value as our estimated value. More concretely, the sampling algorithm
proceeds as follows.
1. Draw N = 4 c2 log(n`2/)/2 independent samples of v ∼ F conditioned on that the valuation
of agent i is vti , where
c =
σv−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)]
Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)]
.
Let v1, . . . ,vN denote these N sample.
2. Use algorithm A to compute an allocation Sk ∼ A(vk) for each sample vk, 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
3. Let wˆsti be the average of v
s
i (S
k
i ), 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
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Lemma 4. The estimated values wˆi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, by the above sampling procedure satisfy for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `,
wˆsti ∈
[
(1− )wsti , (1 + )wsti
]
with probability at least 1− .
Proof. We shall have that
E
[
wˆsti
]
= Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si))] = w
st
i ,
σ
[
wˆsti
]
=
1√
N
σv−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)] =
c√
N
E
[
wˆsti
]
=
c√
N
wsti .
By Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, we get
Pr
[∣∣wˆsti − wsti ∣∣ > wsti ] = Pr
[∣∣wˆsti −E [wˆsti ]∣∣ > √Nc σ [wˆsti ]
]
= Pr
[∣∣wˆsti −E [wˆsti ]∣∣ > 2√log (n`2/)σ [wˆsti ]]
≤ e− log (n`2/) = 
n`2
.
Since we only need to estimate n`2 values, by union bound we get that with probability at
least 1−  the estimated value wˆsti is within  relative error compared to wsti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and
1 ≤ s, t ≤ `.
Thus, if the allocation algorithm A admits SWA social welfare and the ratio c is only polyno-
mially large, then by part 2 of Theorem 1 we get that mechanism MA gives (1− 3) · SWA social
welfare and is 4vmax-BIC. The running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/, assuming
a black-box call to algorithm A can be done in a single step. In other words, we get a FPTAS
reduction.
The next lemma gives an alternative bound of the sampling error with respect to absolute error.
Lemma 5. If we draw N ′ = 4 log(n`2/)/2 independent samples, then with probability at least
1−  the estimated values wˆsti ∈ [wsti − vmax, wsti + vmax] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `.
Proof. In this case, we have
E
[
wˆsti
]
= Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si))] = w
st
i ,
σ
[
wˆsti
]
=
1√
N ′
σv−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)] ≤
1√
N ′
max
Si
vsi (Si) ≤
1√
N ′
vmax .
By Chernoff bound we get that
Pr
[∣∣wˆsti − wsti ∣∣ > vmax] ≤ Pr [∣∣wˆsti −E [wˆsti ]∣∣ > √
N ′
σ
[
wˆsti
]]
= Pr
[∣∣wˆsti −E [wˆsti ]∣∣ > 2√log (n`2/)σ [wˆsti ]]
≤ e− log (n`2/) = 
n`2
.
By union bound, we have wˆsti ∈ [wsti − vmax, wsti + vmax] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `.
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Suppose the ratio vmax/SW
A is upper bounded by a polynomial of the input size. Then, if we
choose  = δ SWA/2nvmax in the above lemma, we will get that∣∣wˆsti − wsti ∣∣ < δ SWA/2n .
By part 3 of Theorem 1 we obtain that mechanismMA provides at least (1− δ)SWA of social
welfare and is 4-BIC and IR. The running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/δ.
5 Reductions for revenue and residual surplus
In the reduction for social welfare in the previous section, we only consider market-clearing allo-
cations in the induced assignment problems. This is because for any agent i, we want to make
sure that the intermediate algorithm Bi is transparent to all agents except agent i. If we restrict
ourselves to market-clearing allocations, we do not know any way to get reasonable bounds on
revenue and residual surplus.
However, if we focus on an important sub-class of multi-parameter mechanism design problems
that includes the combinatorial auction problem and its special cases, then we have some flexibility
in choosing the allocations for the induced assignment problem and obtain theoretical bounds on
revenue and residual surplus. More concretely, we will consider mechanism design problems that
are downward-closed. We let φ denote the null service so that allocating φ to an agent implies that
agent is not served, that is, vi(φ) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Definition 7. A multi-parameter mechanism design problem 〈I,J ,V ,F 〉 is downward-closed if for
any feasible allocation S = (S1, . . . , Sn) ∈ J and any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the allocation (S1, . . . , Si−1, φ, Si+1, . . . , Sn)
is also feasible.
We let δ = min{fi(s) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ s ≤ `, fi(s) > 0} denote the granularity of the prior
distributions. We will prove the following result.
Theorem 2. For any algorithm A, there is a mechanism that is IR, BIC, and provides at least
Ω(SWA/ log(1/δ)) of revenue (residual surplus).
5.1 Meta-reduction.
We will first introduce a meta-reduction scheme based on algorithms that compute envy-free so-
lutions for fractional assignment problems. Suppose C is an algorithm that computes envy-free
solutions (x,p) for any given fractional assignment problem. Let A be an algorithm for a multi-
parameter mechanism design problem 〈I,J ,V ,F 〉. We will convert algorithm A into to a mecha-
nism MCA:
1. For each agent i (Pre-computation)
(a) Estimate the values wi = {wsti }1≤s,t≤` for the induced assignment problem of agent i
with respect to A. Let wˆi = {wˆsti }1≤s,t≤` denote the estimated values.
(b) Use C to solve the induced assignment problems with estimated values. Let (xi,pi)
denote the solution by C for the induce assignment problem of agent i.
(c) Let yti = fi(t)−
∑`
s=1 x
st
i denote the unallocated supply of virtual product t in solution
(xi,pi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ t ≤ `.
(d) Let yi =
∑`
t=1 y
t
i denote the total amount of unallocated virtual products in (xi,pi) for
all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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2. Manipulate the valuations with intermediate algorithm Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as follows: (Decou-
pling)
(a) Suppose the reported valuation of agent i is v′i = v
s
i .
(b) Let v˜i = Bi(v′i) = vti with probability xist/fi(s) for 1 ≤ t ≤ `.
(c) With probability 1 −∑t xsti /fi(s), the manipulated valuation v˜i is unspecified in the
previous step. In this case, let v˜i = v
t
i with probability y
t
i/yi for 1 ≤ t ≤ `.
3. Allocate services as follows: (Allocation)
(a) Compute a tentative allocation S˜ = (S˜1, . . . , S˜n) = A(v˜).
(b) For each agent i, let Si = S˜i if the manipulated valuation v˜i is specified in step 2b). Let
Si = φ otherwise. Allocate services according to S.
(c) For each agent i, suppose the reported valuation is v′i = v
s
i and the manipulated valuation
is v˜i = v
t
i , charge agent i with price p
t
iv
s
i (Si)/wˆ
st
i .
The following theorem states the above meta-reduction scheme converts algorithms into IR and
BIC mechanisms.
Theorem 3. Suppose the algorithm C always provides envy-free solutions.
1. If the estimated values wˆi are accurate, then mechanism MCA is IR and BIC.
2. If the estimated values wˆi satisfy that for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `, wˆsti ∈ [(1− )wsti , (1 + )wsti ], then
MCA is IR and 4vmax-BIC.
3. If the estimated values wˆi satisfy that for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `, wˆsti ∈ [wsti − , wsti + ], then MCA
is IR and 4-BIC.
Proof. Let us outline the proof for part 1. Proofs of the other two parts are calculations along the
same line.
Note that pti ≤ wsti for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `. The mechanism is IR because for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ s ≤ ` the utility for an agent i with valuation vsi in any realization is
vsi (Si)− pti
vsi (Si)
wsti
≥ 0 .
Next, we will show that mechanismMCA is BIC. We first verify that the intermediate algorithms
Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, satisfy the constraint (3). For any agent i, if its valuation vi is drawn from distribution
Fi, then the probability that the manipulated valuation v˜i = Bi(vi) = vti is∑`
s=1
fi(s)
[
xsti
fi(s)
+
(
1−
∑`
r=1
xsri
fi(s)
)
yti
yi
]
=
∑`
s=1
xsti +
(∑`
s=1
fi(s)−
∑`
s=1
∑`
r=1
xsri
)
yti
yi
=
∑`
s=1
xsti +
(∑`
r=1
fi(r)−
∑`
r=1
∑`
s=1
xsri
)
yti
yi
=
∑`
s=1
xsti +
∑`
r=1
(
fi(r)−
∑`
s=1
xisr
)
yti
yi
=
∑`
s=1
xsti +
∑`
r=1
yri
yti
yi
=
∑`
s=1
xsti + y
t
i = fi(t) .
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Thus, we get that for each agent i, the intermediate algorithms Bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n and j 6= i, are
transparent to it. So the expected value of agent i of the service it gets, when its genuine valuation
is vi = v
s
i and the manipulate valuation, is v˜i = v
t
i is exactly
wsti = Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)] .
Hence, the expected value of agent i of the servie it gets, when its genuine valuation is vi = v
s
i
and the reported valuation is v′i = v
t
i , is
w˜sti =
∑`
r=1
xtri
fi(t)
wsri .
And the expected price for agent i when the reported valuation is v′i = v
t
i is
p˜ti =
∑`
r=1
xtri
fi(t)
Ev−i,S∼A(vri ,v−i)
[
pri
vti(Si)
wtri
]
=
∑`
r=1
xtri
fi(t)
pri .
Thus, the the expected utility of agent i, when its genuine valuation is vi = v
s
i and its reported
valuation is v′i = v
t
i , is
w˜sti − p˜ti =
∑`
r=1
xtri
fi(t)
(wsri − pri ) ≤
∑`
r=1
xtri
fi(t)
max
k
{wski − pki } = max
k
{wski − pki } .
Since pi are chosen to be the envy-free prices, we have that x
sr
i > 0 only if w
sr
i −pri = maxk{wski −
pki }. Hence, when agent i reports its valuation truthfully, that is, s = t, the above inequality if
tight. Moreover, the above utility is always non-negative. So mechanism MCA is BIC.
Moreover, the revenue and residual surplus of mechanism MCA is related to the social welfare
and revenue of the induced assignment problems as stated in following proposition.
Proposition 1. The expected revenue (residual surplus) of the mechanism MCA equals the sum of
the revenue (residual surplus) of the manipulated assignment problems.
By choosing proper allocation algorithm C, we can obtain theoretical bounds for the revenue or
residual surplus in the manipulated induced assignment problems and thus theoretical bounds for
mechanism MCA.
5.2 Assignment algorithms.
In this section, we will introduce two algorithms for computing envy-free solutions for the induced
assignment problems. These two algorithms provides theoretical bounds for revenue and residual
surplus.
Revenue. The first algorithm provides revenue that is a Ω(1/ log(1/δ)) fraction of SWA, the
social welfare by algorithm A. The idea is to introduce proper reserve prices to the induced
assignment problems by redundant virtual buyers. This is inspired by the techniques by Guruswami
et al. [GHK+05]. For the induced assignment problem of agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the assignment
algorithm CR for revenue maximization proceeds as follows:
1. Find the social welfare maximizing allocation xi = {xsti }1≤s,t≤`.
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2. Suppose umax is the maximal valuation among the virtual buyer-product pair (s, t) with
non-zero xsti , that is,
umax = max{wsti : 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `, xsti > 0} .
3. Recall that δ = min{fi(t) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ t ≤ `, fi(t) > 0} denotes the granularity of the
prior distribution. For 1 ≤ k ≤ log(1/δ):
(a) Consider the following variant of the induced assignment instance of agent i:
For each virtual product 1 ≤ t ≤ `, add a dummy virtual buyer with demand 1 + δ and
value uk = umax/2
k for virtual product t and value 0 for other virtual products.
(b) Find social welfare maximizing allocation xik and envy-free prices pik for this variant.
(c) Let (xˆik, pˆik) be the projection of (xik,pik) on the original induced assignment problem
of agent i, that is, for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `, xˆstik = xstik, pˆtik = ptik.
4. Return the (xˆik, pˆik), 1 ≤ k ≤ log(1/δ), with best revenue.
Lemma 6. Assignment algorithm CR always return an envy-free solution (x,p). The revenue is
at least a Ω(1/ log(1/δ)) fraction of the optimal social welfare of the assignment problem.
Proof. The envy-freeness follows from the fact that (xˆik, pˆik), 1 ≤ k ≤ log(1/δ), are projections of
envy-free solutions and thus are also envy-free.
Now we consider the revenue by CR. We let rk denote the revenue by solution (xˆik, pˆik). Note
that in (xˆik, pˆik), all prices are at least uk and the amount of virtual products that are sold is at
least
∑
s,t:wsti ≥uk x
st
i . Hence, we have
rk ≥ wk
∑
s,t:wst≥uk
xsti .
Note that if we extend the definition of uk and let uk = umax/2
k for all non-negative integer k,
then we have
∞∑
k=1
uk
∑
s,t:wsti ≥uk
xsti =
∞∑
k=1
(uk−1 − uk)
∑
s,t:wsti ≥uk
xsti
=
∑`
s=1
∑`
t=1
xsti
∑
k:wsti ≥uk
(uk−1 − uk)
=
∑`
s=1
∑`
t=1
xsti max
k
{uk−1 : wsti ≥ uk}
≥
∑
s,t
xsti w
st
i . (4)
On the other hand, the contribution of the tail is small compared to the social welfare.
∞∑
k=log(1/δ)+1
uk
∑
s,t:wsti ≥uk
xsti ≤
∞∑
k=log(1/δ)+1
wk ≤ δwmax
2
≤
∑
s,t x
st
i w
st
i
2
. (5)
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The last inequality holds because allocating the most valuable virtual product the one of the
virtual buyer is a feasible allocation. Hence, consider the difference of the above formulas, (4)−(5),
and we get that
log(1/δ)∑
k=1
rk ≥
log(1/δ)∑
k=1
uk
∑
s,t:wst≥uk
xsti ≥
∑
s,t x
st
i w
st
i
2
.
Thus, by pigeon-hole-principle at least one of the assignment (xˆik, pˆik) provides revenue that is
at least a 1/2 log(1/δ) fraction of the social welfare.
The above lemma leads to the following results for revenue maximization.
Proposition 2. Suppose the social welfare given by allocation algorithm A is SWA, the mechanism
MCRA guarantees at least Ω(SWA/ log(1/δ)) of revenue.
Complementary lower bound. The approximation ratio with respect to SWA is tight due to
the following example. Consider the auction problem with only one agent and one item. Suppose
with probability 1/2k the agent has value 2k for the item for k = 1, 2, . . . , log(1/δ). And with
probability δ, the agent has value 0 for the item. In this example, the granularity of the prior
distribution is δ. The optimal social welfare is
∑log(1/δ)
k=1
1
2k
2k = log(1/δ). But no BIC mechanism
can achieve revenue better than 1.
Residual surplus. We turn to the residual surplus maximization problem. Note that revenue
and residual surplus are symmetric in the induced assignment problems. We will use the following
assignment algorithm CRS based on the same idea we use for the revenue maximization algorithm.
The residual surplus maximizing envy-free algorithm CRS is as follows:
1. Find the social welfare maximizing allocation xi = {xsti }1≤s,t≤`.
2. Suppose umax is the maximal valuation among the virtual buyer-product pair (s, t) with
non-zero xsti , that is,
umax = max{wsti : 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `, xsti > 0} .
3. Recall that δ = min{fi(t) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ t ≤ `, fi(t) > 0} denotes the granularity of the
prior distribution. For 1 ≤ k ≤ log(1/δ):
(a) Consider the following variant of the induced assignment instance of agent i:
For each virtual buyer 1 ≤ t ≤ `, add a dummy virtual product with demand 1 + δ and
value uk = umax/2
k for virtual buyer t and value 0 for other virtual buyer.
(b) Find social welfare maximizing allocation xik and envy-free prices pik for this variant.
(c) Let (xˆik, pˆik) be the projection of (xik,pik) on the original induced assignment problem
of agent i, that is, for any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `,
xˆstik = x
st
ik , pˆ
t
ik = p
t
ik .
4. Return the (xˆik, pˆik), 1 ≤ k ≤ log(1/δ), with best revenue.
The proofs of the following lemma and theorem is almost identical to the revenue maximization
part so we omit the proofs here.
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Lemma 7. Assignment algorithm CRS always return an envy-free solution (x,p). The residual
surplus is at least a Ω(1/ log(1/δ)) fraction of the optimal social welfare of the assignment problem.
Proposition 3. Suppose the social welfare given by allocation algorithm A is SWA, the mechanism
MCRSA guarantees at least Ω(SWA/ log(1/δ)) of residual surplus.
6 Application in combinatorial auctions
In this section we will briefly illustrates how to use the reduction for social welfare in this paper to
derive a combinatorial auction mechanism that matches the best algorithmic result.
Combinatorial auctions. In the combinatorial auctions, we consider a principal with m items
(exactly one copy of each item) and n agents. Each agent has a private valuation vi ∼ Fi for subsets
of items. The goal is to design a protocol to allocate the items and to charge prices to the agents.
We will show the following corollaries of our reduction for social welfare.
Corollary 2. For combinatorial auctions with sub-additive (or fractionally sub-additive) agents
where the prior distributions have finite and poly-size supports, there is a
(
1
2 − 
)
-approximate (or(
1− 1e − 
)
-approximate respectively), vmax-BIC, and IR mechanism for social welfare maximiza-
tion. The running time is polynomial in the input size and 1/.
Algorithm. We will consider a variant of the LP-based algorithms by Feige [Fei06] and use the
reduction for social welfare to convert it into an IR and vmax-BIC mechanism. More concretely,
we will consider the Bayesian version of the standard social welfare maximization linear program
(CA):
Maximize
∑
i
∑
t
∑
S
fi(t) v
t
i(S)xi,t,S s.t.∑
i
∑
t
∑
S:j∈S
fi(t)xi,t,S ≤ 1 ∀j∑
S
xi,t,S ≤ 1 ∀i, t
xi,t,S ≥ 0 ∀i, t, S
In this LP, xi,t,S denote the probability that agent i is allocated with a subset of items S
conditioned on its valuation is vti . This LP can be solved in polynomial time by the standard
primal dual technique via demand queries. See [DNS05] for more details. We let LP ∗ denote the
optimal value of this LP. Moreover, for any basic feasible optimal solution of the above LP, there
are at most nm` non-zero entries since there are only nm` non-trivial constraints. Hence, we have
the following lemma:
Lemma 8. In poly-time we can find an optimal solution x∗ to (CA) with at most nm` non-zero
entries.
Next, we will filter this solution x∗ by removing insignificant entries. We let xˆi,t,S = x∗i,t,S <
/nm`. Note that LP ∗ ≥ fi(t)vti(S) for any i, t, and S since always allocating subset S to agent i
is a feasible allocation. We get that xˆ is a feasible solution to (CA) with value at least (1− )LP ∗.
Then, we will use the rounding algorithms by Feige [Fei06] to get a 12 -rounding for sub-additive
agents and a
(
1− 1e
)
-rounding for fractionally sub-additive agents:
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1. Allocate a tentative subset of items S˜i to each agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, according to the reported
valuation v′i = v
t
i and xˆi,t,S˜i .
2. Resolve conflicts properly by choosing Si ⊆ S˜i so that S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is a feasible allocation.
By extending Feige’s original proof, we can show that there is a randomized algorithm for
choosing S such that for sub-additive agents, we have:
Ev−i,S [vi(Si)] ≥
1
2
vi(S˜i) . (6)
And for fractionally sub-additive agents, we have:
Ev−i,S [vi(Si)] ≥
(
1− 1
e
)
vi(S˜i) . (7)
We will omit the proof in this extended abstract. We denote the above algorithm as A. Then,
A provides (12 − )-approximation for sub-additive agents and (1− 1e − )-approximation for frac-
tionally sub-additive agents.
Estimating values. By Theorem 1 and 2, we only need to show how to estimate the values wi,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, for the induced assignment problem of agent i efficiently. Further, by Lemma 4, we can
efficiently estimate the values wi = {wsti }1≤s,t≤`, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if the following lemma holds.
Lemma 9. For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and any 1 ≤ s, t ≤ `,
σv−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)]
Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)]
≤
√
4nm`

.
Proof. By inequalities (6) and (7), we get that conditioned on S˜i being chosen as the tentative set,
Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i)
[
vsi (Si) : S˜i
]
≥ 1
2
vsi
(
S˜i
)
.
We also have that
σv−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i)
[
vsi (Si) : S˜i
]
≤ max
{
vsi (Si) : S˜i
}
≤ vsi (S˜i) .
Hence,
σv−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)]
2 =
∑
S˜i
xˆ
i,t,S˜i
σv−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i)
[
vsi (Si) : S˜i
]2
≤
∑
S˜i
xˆ
i,t,S˜i
vsi (S˜i)
2
≤ 1
min
{
xˆ
i,t,S˜i
> 0
}
∑
i,t,S˜i
xˆ
i,t,S˜i
vsi (S˜i)
2
≤ nm`

∑
S˜i
xˆ
i,t,S˜i
Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i)
[
vsi (Si) : S˜i
]2
≤ 4nm`

Ev−i,S∼A(vti ,v−i) [v
s
i (Si)]
2 .
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